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PRAGMATISM REGAINED
Christopher Kutz*

THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE. By Jules Coleman. New York: Oxford
University Press. 2001. Pp. xx, 226. $39.95.

I.

FROM PRACTICE TO THEORY

Jules Coleman's The Practice of Principle1 serves as a focal point
for current, newly intensified debates in legal theory, and provides
some of the deepest, most sustained reflections on methodology that
legal theory has seen. Coleman is one of the leading legal philosophers
in the Anglo-American world, and his writings on tort theory, contract
theory, the normative foundations of law and economics, social choice
theory, and analytical jurisprudence have been the point of departure
for much of the most interesting activity in the field for the last three
decades. Indeed, the origin of this book lies in Oxford University's in
vitation to Coleman to deliver the Clarendon Lectures in Law in 1998,
one of the greatest honors for legal scholars. Moreover, unlike many
law school "legal theorists," Coleman's high standing within the legal
academy is fully matched in the professional philosophical world.
Practice will surely be mined for years for its many and subtle discus
sions of the nature of law and legal argument. The book is a wonderful
achievement, both for Coleman himself, and for the development of
rigorous philosophical study of the law.
Coleman's first publication, "On the Moral Argument for the Fault
System," appeared in the · flagship Journal of Philosophy at a time
when work on first-order problems of law - as opposed to second
order questions about the nature of law - was frequently disparaged
by professional philosophers as mere "application."2 Coleman's early
writings helped significantly to change that, by showing that deep
philosophical issues of responsibility and justice were raised by our le*
Assistant Professor of Law, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program, Boalt Hall
School of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.A. 1989, Yale; Ph.D. (Philosophy)
1996, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1997, Yale. - Ed. I am grateful to Jules
Coleman and Mark Greenberg for their very helpful comments. Some of the material in this
Review will also appear in the Times Literary Supplement.

1 . Jules Coleman is Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Profes
sor of Philosophy, Yale University.
2. Jules L. Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473
(1974).
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gal practices and that our concepts of justice and fault could not be
fully understood apart from those practices. What Coleman brought to
the field of legal philosophy was both the conceptual rigor of his
graduate training at Rockefeller University as well as an interest in
and sensitivity to the way risk and responsibility are actually allocated
through tort law. In his own work, and in fostering the work of others,
Coleman has greatly expanded the range and interest of legal philoso
phy, moving beyond the mainstays of jurisprudence and constitutional
law to the private law of tort and contract.
His 1992 book, Risks and Wrongs, set out his general view of those
fields.3 Coleman argued that tort doctrine must be understood as the
institutionalization of a distinctive moral view, "corrective justice," ac
cording to which wrongdoers bear duties to rectify the wrongful losses
they inflict on their victims. Such a view is opposed, on the one hand,
to the strict liability view put forward by Richard Epstein,4 according
to which causing harm, faultlessly or not, suffices for liability; and on
the other to the economic theory of tort, whose chief proponents are
Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi,5 according to which liability
properly rests with the party best able to reduce the costs of both acci
dents and accident prevention, independent of any causal or faulty re
sponsibility for the accident. By contrast, Coleman's interpretation of
contract law rejected seeing it as embodying a distinctive moral con
ception (as, for example, Charles Fried has influentially argued6).
Rather, argues Coleman, contract law is best understood functionally,
as a piece of a more general liberal political theory. With the econo
mists, Coleman sees contract law's chief justification in its facilitation
of economic markets. But where the economists see the chief value of
markets as lying in their promotion of allocative efficiency, Coleman
understands their virtues in richer, more political terms: markets per
mit social cooperation in the circumstances of liberal societies, that is,
divisive pluralism and individual freedom.
Coleman's argument in that earlier work reflects a general claim,
that abstract concepts must be understood in terms of the practices
they structure. This claim is a hallmark of philosophical pragmatism
and has been implicit in most of Coleman's writing. Now he has
paused to make it explicit, and to show how other, related, theses of
philosophical pragmatism help to illuminate and ground the substan
tive positions he has advanced over the years.

3. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992).

4. Richard Epstein, A Theory ofStrict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
5. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); RICHARD POSNER &
WILLIAM LANDES, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF TORT LAW (1987).
6. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
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The Practice of Principle is, in effect, two books. The first returns
to the subject of tort law. Here Coleman's concern is not setting out
his substantive view of tort law, although this work does provide an
opportunity for him to knit together his corrective justice view with
some other recent work coauthored with Arthur Ripstein, setting out
an account of the relation between corrective and distributive justice.7
Rather, Coleman's concern is methodological, with the question of
what kind of account of a body of law should be deemed an adequate
explanation. In this half of the book, Coleman's principal adversary is
named "the economic approach to law," and represents not any par
ticular figures, but rather a theoretical commitment to explaining and
justifying legal institutions in terms of the economic value of effi
ciency. Coleman hopes to offer an exceedingly ambitious argument:
not just that his corrective justice account of tort law is superior to the
economists', but that only an account like his, one that takes the inter
nal structure of tort law seriously, could ever be a contender.
The second "book" takes up questions of general, or "conceptual"
jurisprudence: what is law, what authority does it have, and how is law
possible? Again, the point of Coleman's discussion here is not to pres
ent new substantive answers to these questions, but rather to show
how a position he originally put forward twenty years ago, in "Nega
tive and Positive Positivism,"8 can draw upon a broader pragmatic ap
proach to overcome powerful objections raised against his and similar
accounts. Legal positivism, at the most general level, involves the
claim that law is grounded ultimately and only in social facts, where
"social facts" include conventions, practices, and beliefs. But positiv
ists have disagreed whether moral criteria - tests of moral goodness
- can be incorporated into the conventions defining a community's
law, with Coleman (following H.L.A. Hart) arguing for a capacious
view, while Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro argue that moral tests can
never partly constitute a community's law without undermining the
basic function of law, guiding conduct.9 Coleman also takes the occa
sion to defend the general project of conceptual jurisprudence against
two objections voiced by Ronald Dworkin and Brian Leiter, who criti
cize positivism for, on the one hand, an impossible pretence of value
neutrality; and on the other of poaching on the proper territory of so
cial scientists in claiming to illuminate a form of social organization.
This Review will touch on the larger themes of Coleman's book,
but it cannot do justice to all its contents, for Practice is dense and
7. Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91
(1995).
8. Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982),
reprinted in JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3 (1988).
9. See JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 37, 50-51 (1979); Scott Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469 (1998).
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rich, with new arguments appearing on almost every page. It is also a
difficult book, in great part because of the conceptual difficulties of
the issues Coleman considers, and the great range of theoretical con
siderations he brings to bear on those issues. While the general subject
matter should be of interest to anyone working in legal theory,
broadly speaking, the detail and rigor of its arguments may leave non
specialists a little dazed.10 But for those with a serious interest in the
field of legal philosophy, this is a must-read. Even those who reject
Coleman's methods and substantive claims will benefit from the char
acteristic lucidity and incisiveness with which he sketches rival posi
tions, alternatives, and problems for the field.
Just as important, a signal virtue of Coleman's book is the excite
ment it embodies about the state of the field. The book vibrates with
critical engagement, with both arguments and authors. The reader has
the impression of being invited to a particularly lively philosophy
seminar, whose members are both familiar (e.g., Ronald Dworkin)
and relatively new (e.g., Scott Shapiro). On every page Coleman is
confronting, criticizing, and endorsing others' views, as well as ex
plaining how his own views have shifted over time. The consequence
of this strongly dialectical approach is that the book does not really
purport to present definitive answers to the problems it treats;
Coleman's views will likely shift again in the future. The book, then,
offers a snapshot of Coleman's mind and the debates his work drives.
In that sense, the book may seem less satisfying than the traditional
philosophical treatise, in which the appearance of finality is scrupu
lously maintained by the rhetoric of the obviousness of the author's
conclusions. Coleman's approach is, by contrast, refreshingly honest.
The problems are hard, and a philosopher would be a fool to think his
or her views the final words on the matter.
II. PRAGMATISM, PRINCIPLE AND TORT
According to Coleman, The Practice of Principle is supposed to
both exemplify and explain philosophical pragmatism as applied to le
gal theory (p. xi). Because pragmatism is, to varying degrees, the uni
fying thread of this book, it is worth getting clear from the start what
Coleman means - and does not mean - by it. For "pragmatism" is a
word much in vogue in legal academia. A recent Westlaw search turns
up nearly 200 law journal articles with "pragmatic" or "pragmatism"
in the title,11 on subjects ranging from administrative law,12 to envi10. The book has one serious defect: a virtual absence of specific references to the cur
rent literature, including the works of authors Coleman discusses at length. This is particu
larly unfortunate because it excludes interested readers who might otherwise find this a
helpful introduction to contemporary debates in this field.
1 1 . Search on Westlaw (JLR database), conducted Feb. 10, 2002.
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ronmental law,13 to voting rights law,14 not to mention at least two spe
cial symposia specifically noting the emergence of pragmatism.15 These
articles range in theoretical depth, and it is fair to say in many that
"pragmatic" functions as a five-dollar synonym for "practical." Others
invoke a more general methodological stance, one that abjures argu
ments from pure principle in the spirit of compromise - in David
Luban's characterization, this is pragmatism as "eclectic, re
sult-oriented, historically minded antiformalism."16
Even among the more reflective proponents of "legal pragma
tism," the term seems to denote a waiver of the requirements of
producing systematic theory, in favor of a bricolage of independently
plausible theoretical assumptions and principles, balanced
against intuitively reasonable outcomes. Daniel Farber's recent
Eco-Pragmatism is typical: "Legal pragmatists are, in part, reacting
against the increased obsession of some other legal scholars with
grand theories such as economic reductionism . . . . We can have better
hopes of building an interlocking web of arguments that will support a
decision based on diverse, overlapping considerations."17 There may
indeed be good reasons to avoid difficult theoretical work in particular
times and places: not all debates happen in seminar rooms, nor is the
solitary cool of the study the appropriate forum for hammering out
policy among parties with sharply conflicting interests and conceptions
of the good.18 Moreover, because philosophical theories by their na
ture are general and tend to underdetermine particular policy conclu
sions, it is often possible at the policy-making level to reach consensus
on particular decisions without needing to square all theoretical
premises. However, such pragmatism, or better "legal pragmatism,"
stands generally to philosophical pragmatism as "legal realism" stands
to philosophical realism, which is to say that the resemblance largely
stops at the orthography. For philosophical pragmatism represents a
12. Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rule
making, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2000).
13. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421
(2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM (1999)).
14. J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influenced Districts and the Pragmatic Tradi
tion in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551 (1993).
15. See Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1
(1996).
16. David Luban, What's Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43,
44 (1996).
17. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 9-10 (1999).
18. The case for practical agreement amid theoretical disagreement has been well made
recently by CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
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constellation of semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical claims,
most of which derive directly or indirectly from arguments about the
relations between theory and evidence,19 and from the priority of in
terpretation to metaphysics.20 In its philosophical form, therefore,
pragmatism represents a deeply-considered theoretical framework, a
framework congenial to a wide-range of substantive ethical and legal
positions.
Coleman's pragmatism is of the latter flavor, and the book may
come as a shock to those seeking the usual pass from theory. Accord
ing to Coleman, philosophical pragmatism is characterized by the fol
lowing five claims or characteristics: (1) "semantic non-atomism": the
idea that meanings reside not in individual concepts but holistically, in
networks of concepts, so that for example the meaning of "fault" can
only be explicated in terms of the related concepts of "harm,''
"agency,'' and "remedy," related inferentially to the term to be ex
plained; (2) "practical inferential role semantics": the meaning of con
cepts is given by the inferences they support in the practices in which
they occur; (3) "explanation by embodiment": normative principles
are explained by showing the practices in which they occur; (4) "con
ceptual holism": what role a concept plays in one practice depends on
its role in other, related practices; and (5) "radical revisability": all be
liefs, both theoretical and empirical, are open to revision on both
theoretical and empirical grounds (pp. 6-7).
Taken together, these claims add up to a distinctive view of human
language, one that sees language not as a kind of transparently
Platonic mapping of reality, but rather as a tool developed and used
for a range of social and theoretical purposes, of discovery, explana
tion, and justification. While mapping reality is, of course, a central
function, linguistic pragmatism emphasizes the social context of the
mapping activity - the way in which our attempts to work out an
understanding of our social and physical environments are done from
here, that is from a temporally and spatially limited location, using
conceptual materials drawn from other activities and projects.
An example will make this clearer. Take the claim "punishment is
the merited response of intentionally inflicted suffering to wrongdo
ers," which might be thought definitional of punishment. According to
the principle of semantic non-atomism, to understand this claim we
need to understand as well the related but unmentioned concepts of
"harm" and "responsibility." Second, a complete understanding of the
19. See PIERRE DUHEM, To SA VE THE PHENOMENA: AN ESSA y ON THE IDEA OF
PHYSICAL THEORY FROM PLATO TO GALILEO (Edmund Dolan & Chaninah Maschier
trans., 1969) (1908); W.V.O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951).
20. See w.v.o. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1 960); Donald Davidson, On the Very
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS'N 47 (1974), reprinted in
DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183 (1984).
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claim and its subsidiary concepts is going to require more than just a
discursive account. Rather, grasping the concept of punishment means
understanding the contexts in which punishment is deployed (or ex
cused), and how punishing relates to practices of compensation or re
venge. And third, we might want to revise our seemingly definitional
claim about the connection of punishment to wrongdoing upon en
countering societies with very different practices. For instance, imag
ine a culture in which norms of forgiveness in the wake of wrongdoing
dominate, where people compete to absorb and forgive the greatest
insults and harms. In such a culture, inflicting suffering on wrongdoers
would not, "by definition," be merited. What this example is meant to
show is that what had seemed on its face a single semantic claim about
the meaning of "punishment" now turns on the relation between pun
ishment and a congeries of associated social practices - that is, turns
on the relation between that individual semantic claim and a particu
lar, contingent, form of life.
The pragmatic view of language defines a research program in
philosophy that treats our concepts and ideals as, in Quine's term,
immanent not transcendent, and so only understandable through an
exploration of their place in our social and physical world.21 In the case
of law, immanent exploration means taking legal doctrine and its con
ceptual skeleton seriously, not just as independent data points which
an explanatory curve must fit but as a systematic phenomenon whose
parts interrelate both conceptually, in being mutually illuminating, and
practically, in sustaining a form of social life whose complexity and
value are recognizable to us as both inhabitants and explorers.
The antithesis of immanent exploration, by contrast, is reduction,
especially as practiced by the legal economists who serve as Coleman's
foil in the first part of the book. Reductions of some phenomena are
helpful - explanatory - when they transform the relatively mysteri
ous into the familiar, or thereby relate an apparently singular phe
nomenon to a range of disparate phenomena, permitting unified theo
retical treatment. Famously, the reduction of heat to molecular motion
does both these things; equally famously, attempts to reduce mental
states like beliefs and desires to neural firings has done neither, giving
up a rich and explanatory theory of human agency for a "science" of
the brain unable to explain the mind's most salient feature, its inten
tionality.22
For Coleman, economists' reduction of tort law's language of the
"duty of care" to "efficiency" is like the reduction of the mental to the
21. W.V.O. Quine, Replies to Davidson, 19 SYNTHESE 303, 305 (1968). For a fuller dis
cussion of the immanent method, see w.v.o. QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND
OTHER ESSAYS (1969).
22. For a polemic along these lines, see JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE
MIND (1992).
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physical, impoverishing rather than enriching our understanding. This
reduction is most explicit in economists' endorsement of the "Learned
Hand test" for negligence, according to which a failure to take precau
tions against causing injury is negligent just if the cost of precaution is
less than the cost of the possible injury, discounted by the probability
of its occurrence.23 (So, for instance, carmakers shouldn't be deemed
negligent for failing to install $10 bumpers if there were only a 0.1 %
chance of a driver causing at most $9,999 in injuries.) The Learned
Hand test may make good sense as social policy in deciding when it is
reasonable to demand injurer compensation, since the incentives it
creates for potential injurers have the effect of lowering the net social
costs of accidents plus precautions - in other words, the true social
costs for the potentially injurious activity. But the question of its gen
eral reasonableness as social policy and its fairness as between the two
parties are two very separate things. Imagine, for example, that it is
very costly for a shipping company to ensure that its drivers do not
drink on the job, but that its drivers do sometimes drink, and when
they do, they cause accidents. The car owner whose car is dented by a
drunken driver will have a legitimate grievance against the company, a
grievance expressed morally as "you need to clean up the messes your
workers make," whose normative force persists even if, as a matter of
overall policy, society is best off leaving the loss with the car owner.
The grievance persists because it expresses a fundamentally rela
tional dimension of morality, the responsibility of the injurer for the
injury to the victim; the Learned Hand test, by contrast, expresses a
non-relational dimension of morality, the responsibility of each to
bear costs when that maximizes social welfare. The two dimensions,
traditionally catalogued as deontological vs. utilitarian, compete in the
reasons they offer, and it is obvious that one is not fully reducible to
the other. Utilitarianism, of which welfare economics is a special form,
assesses acts by reference to whether they will produce more or less
overall welfare in the relevant population; deontological theories, by
contrast, assess acts by their conformity to principles of right - for
example, whether an act expresses disrespect for a particular person,
or whether the act honors a previous commitment.
Take the old chestnut of the deathbed promise: Franz asks his old
friend Max to swear to burn Franz's book manuscripts upon his death,
and Max so promises. But after Franz's death, Max reads them and
realizes they are works of genius, sure to bring pleasure to the world.
What should Max do? For a utilitarian, the matter is obvious: there is
no welfare gain from keeping the promise in this instance, while pub
lishing brings a clear gain. But to the deontological moralist, serious
about the principle that promises ought to be kept, the case poses a
23. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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problem because the promise itself creates a powerful, if not decisive,
reason to burn the manuscripts. A utilitarian might try to end up in the
same place, by arguing for example that welfare is enhanced by our
internalizing rules of thumb regarding promise-keeping, rules that
should be put aside when welfare runs strongly the other way. But this
argument would imply that any sense of dilemma Max feels is just a
matter of irrational carryover, that if he saw things clearly, he would
see he had no reason to honor the promise.24 And this seems wrong:
any adequate account of human morality - one aiming to be true to
both the phenomenology and the practice of promise-making and
moral deliberation - has to recognize the deep force of both sorts of
reasons, utilitarian and deontological. For what is at stake, in Max's
deliberations and in morality's place in our lives generally, is both
Max's particular relation to Franz, to whom he has made a commit
ment, and his relation to humanity in general. Relations to friends,
family, promises, neighbors, the world at large: these structure our
lives, puzzle us, and divide our loyalties. Utilitarianism, in its rede
scription of our relations to particular others in terms of our relations
to humanity in general, fails to take seriously the complexity of our
normative relations to others.
Coleman's argument against the economic approach to tort law
mirrors the debate between deontology and utilitarianism. Tort doc
trine's "bilateral" structure, in Coleman's term, reflects the relational
dimension of morality, in its confrontation of injurer and victim. In
this sense, Coleman says, tort law deeply expresses the corrective jus
tice principle that "individuals who are responsible for the wrongful
losses of others have a duty to repair the losses" (p. 15). All the central
issues of tort law - who may be liable, and under what conditions presuppose this principle, for all involve a confrontation between an
injured plaintiff and an ostensible injurer. This is in fact the heart of
Coleman's argument against the economic approach to tort law. Tort
law fundamentally concerns what to do about what has happened.
Economics, by contrast, is fundamentally oriented around the future;
its concern is how to structure incentives so that future costs will be
minimized. Within economic analysis, an accident's importance is
purely epistemic Q! informational: it can reveal where attractive pres
sure points lie, where incentives might better be tailored, so that the
future will be unlike the past (pp. 15-17). Beyond this role, however,
24. A utilitarian will also argue that Max has a reason to keep his promise because
breaking it might encourage others, in non-welfare-maximizing circumstances, to break
theirs - or will cause worry to those trying to settle their estates. But this response seems
basically ad hoc, turning as it does on empirical predictions about the effects of promise
breaking. It is also unprincipled, for it fails to apply when the promise breaking would not be
known to anyone - yet presumably Max would still regard himself as facing a dilemma in
this case. For discussion, see Samuel Scheffler, Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS
CRITICS 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
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the fact that A hurt B is of no economic concern; it is merely a sunk
cost.25
More generally, as Coleman argues, economists have no principled
way to limit their field of view to these two parties. Indeed, it is an
open question whether liability might better lie with some independ
ent third party who, for whatever reason, is in a better position yet to
take precautions. To continue an example above, perhaps truckers'
mothers are in the best position to check the sobriety of the drivers,
and so ought to be liable for any future accidents in order to encour
age them to check their children's drinking. If economic analyses stop
short of casting the liability net so widely, there are only two possible
reasons: either the contingent fact that the best cost-minimizers are, in
fact, injurers or victims; or a failure by legal economists to realize how
revisionary the instrumental conception of tort law really is to actual
doctrine. Either way, economics fails to account for the deepest fea
ture of tort law, its concern to repair a past harm, and thus it fails as an
explanation of tort law in general.
Of course, the forward-looking perspective of economics is present
in contemporary tort law, most notably in products liability,26 as well,
arguably, in older doctrines such as respondeat superior. But these in
cursions of instrumentalism occur at the margins, as exceptions to the
bilateral logic of tort law. Coleman's claim, to be sure, is not that de
partures from the corrective justice model are unwarranted, or that a
frankly revisionary conception of economic theory should not guide
institutional reform. Even the plaintiffs' bar could not argue with a
straight face that tort law, with all its costs, is the only just way for a
society to deal with accidental harm. Coleman, indeed, recognizes the
possibility that we might be better off scrapping the tort system for an
alternative, for example New Zealand's general no fault insurance
scheme (p. 59). The central point of his argument is simple: a theory of
what tort law is must respect, not eliminate, its basic structure; and the
economic approach to tort law fails to do this.
This flaw at the heart of the economic approach would seem to be
fatal, but Coleman goes on to discuss some other ways an efficiency
centered account of law might be helpful even if it fails as a conceptual
reduction. The first is if economics offered a "functional explanation"
of the sort favored by evolutionary psychologists. A functional expla
nation of something - say, a structure such as the eye, or a practice
such as altruism - tries to show how the fact that it furthers some goal
25. Judge Hand's deployment of the cost-benefit test for negligence is thus only partially
compatible with law and economics, since it assumes that liability will lie, if at all, only with
the injurer. Full-bore economic analysis, however, must consider the whole universe of po
tential cost-minimizers.
v.

26. The locus classicus in American tort law is Justice Traynor's concurrence in Esco/a
Coca Cola Bottling Co. , 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
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explains its presence. On an evolutionary account, the fact that (some)
species have eyes is explained functionally, by the fact that eyes en
hance survival. Creatures with eyes are likely to be more successful in
reproducing, and so passing on the eye trait, than creatures without
eyes. Thus, assuming a mechanism for generating the eye trait in some
individuals (random mutation in evolutionary theory), and a filtering
process by which the trait can spread through a population (reproduc
tive competition and heritability), the presence of eyes is explained by
their function of enhancing survival.
An economist trying to make a similar case for tort law would ac
cept the complex, relational structure of tort doctrine, and then try to
show how the presence of that structure, as a whole, is explained by its
function of enhancing efficiency. But this is not easy, for it involves
showing, first, that the structure of tort law does, in fact, enhance effi
ciency - at least relative to other systems of social organization that
might have emerged - and, second, that there is some plausible fil
tering process through which the tort system, complex relational struc
ture and all, has emerged because, in fact, it maximizes efficiency. But,
as Coleman argues, no such explanations are on the horizon (p. 27).
While economists have argued whether particular rules within tort law
are, or are not, efficient, they have not taken up the task of arguing
that tort law as a whole promotes efficiency. And even if that claim
were accepted, no one has shown evidence for a filtering mechanism
by which efficiency-promoting structures, rather than others, would
come to dominate social practice. While there are today some eco
nomically-oriented judges on the bench, that is a very recent phe
nomenon and it can't help in explaining structures of tort doctrine
dating from English common law. So the functional explanation is a
nonstarter.
Coleman next considers whether an efficiency-centered account
might work as what Ronald Dworkin has called a "constructive inter
pretation" of tort law. An account provides a constructive interpreta
tion when it shows a practice or institution in its best light, making it
the "best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to
belong."27 To take Dworkin's example, a reading of MacBeth that in
terpreted the play as a murder mystery rather than as a tragedy would
fail as an account of that play, not because the murder mystery ac
count could not explain all the features of the play - there are lots of
bodies lying around, after all - but because such an interpretation
would make it a bad murder mystery rather than a powerful tragedy.
For Dworkin, understanding what a thing is is essentially a matter of
seeing what it is for, what it does best. So, if economic analysis pro
vided a constructive interpretation of tort law, it would have to show
27. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52 (1986).
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why ordering tort law around efficiency reveals it as, in some sense, a
more attractive institution than do other plausible accounts. But, as
Coleman persuasively argues, interpreting tort doctrine in terms of ef
ficiency does not seem to reveal its structure in an attractive light;
rather, it seems to impose upon its structure an alien organizing prin
ciple, for the reasons discussed above (p. 31). Second, there's simply
no reason to think that the value of efficiency does make tort law
more attractive than does corrective justice. If efficiency is where we
want to go, then tort law under any interpretation may not be the way
to get there. (Similarly, someone looking to read an entertaining mys
tery would do better to pick up an Agatha Christie novel than to force
such an interpretation on MacBeth.28)
Finally, Coleman considers whether the economic account of tort
law might nonetheless be more attractive than the corrective justice
account because the economic account manifests the explanatory vir
tue of "consilience," or the ability to explain many different, related
phenomena with a single concept. Coleman suggests that if we expand
the scope of the economic account beyond efficiency, to the more
general goal of risk-regulation, then we might get an account of tort
law that lets us see how tort law fits together with contract law, prop
erty, and perhaps even criminal law (pp. 37-38). In fact, the success of
economics within the legal academy is largely a product of its pur
ported success in providing a unifying treatment of isolated doctrinal
puzzles. Coleman's argument at this point is more generous to eco
nomic analysis. He grants that, to the extent economic analysis ex
plains tort law at all, it does so in a way that permits tort's explanatory
unification with the rest of private law, and then some. But, Coleman
argues, in perhaps the most interesting chapter in this part of the
book, the corrective justice account is also nicely consilient. For not
only are the central concepts of corrective justice - agency, responsi
bility, duty, repair - found throughout our social practices, but the
corrective justice account of responsibility for misfortune can help to
illuminate what Coleman sees as the basic idea of distributive justice:
who owns what costs? As Coleman and Ripstein argued in "Mischief
and Misfortune,"29 the question for tort law concerns the costs of acci
dents, and the question for distributive justice concerns the costs of
congenital misfortune, such as being born poor, or disabled, or untal
ented. Examination of corrective justice reveals that there is no non
normative, purely naturalistic way of assigning costs to agents. Heroic
attempts, notably by Richard Epstein, have been made to make causa-

28. This, indeed, is consistent with a general criticism of Dworkinian constructive inter
pretations: that making something the best it can be may, in fact, make it into something
else.
29. Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 7.
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tion the key to assigning liability for accidents;30 and by Dworkin to
make "brute" versus "option" luck the basis for assigning responsibil
ity for congenital misfortune.31 But Coleman and Ripstein show convincingly to my mind - that neither causation nor luck on their
own can determine the content of a scheme of justice. Causation is too
promiscuous a concept: any necessary condition of an event is a cause,
the driver driving or the pedestrian walking. And what makes congeni
tal bad luck so hard to bear, and thus a proper object for action by re
distributive institutions, is a prior conviction that undeserved harms
warrant compensation. In both cases, what does the work is a more
basic conception of "the requirements of political fairness as reciproc
ity among free and equal persons" (p. 45). And thus the elements of
the corrective justice account can illuminate two bodies of normative
theory initially thought fully distinct. On grounds of consilience, then,
corrective justice scores at least a tie.
Coleman's argument for the superiority of the corrective justice
account in illuminating tort law is highly persuasive. Indeed,
Coleman's refutation of the economic approach is so persuasive that
the reader may well wonder whether anyone today seriously holds a
belief for economics as a descriptive account of tort doctrine. This is a
fair question, since Coleman provides no references to economists
making the descriptive claim, and the principal work setting out the
descriptive account, by Richard Posner and William Landes, is now
twenty years old. It is true that the economic account does still play a
significant role in legal pedagogy, where its descriptive and normative
aspirations are rarely disambiguated; and it is prominent in descriptive
accounts of transactional law, such as contracts. But it would appear
that the economists have already abandoned the descriptive project in
tort for the greener pastures of reform, or for the evaluation of the
relative efficiency of particular rules rather than the system as a whole.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, two of the most influential legal
economists working today, describe their own work as wholly norma
tive, a technically sophisticated utilitarianism.32 Their argument in tort
law is that legal policies should promote social welfare, which is
maximized by efficiency-centered approaches, not ill-defined notions
of justice or fairness.33 This approach takes on corrective justice as a
normative, not a descriptive matter. Of course, it presumes that the
structure of tort law is sufficiently compatible with the value of effi
ciency that reform, rather than scrapping the whole, is a live possibil30. Epstein, supra note 4.
31. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2000).
32. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961
(2001).
33. Id. at 1039-52.
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ity. In that sense, economists like Shavell and Kaplow may fail to rec
ognize the radical alternative to corrective justice that economics pre
sents. But even if they are right about the possibility of insinuating a
forward-looking value into the structure of a backward-looking doc
trine, they need not be interpreted to claim that tort law is already ori
ented around efficiency. Coleman's criticisms largely pass by them,
and most other legal economists working today.
In any case, the real interest of the economic account lies in its
service as a foil for Coleman's own demonstration of the pragmatic
method in normative theorizing. Much modern moral and political
philosophy begins from within our experience, often in the form of
"intuitions" whose epistemological status as deliverances of some ex
ternal moral reality rather than conventional prejudice always seems
suspect. On the other hand, forms of moral and political philosophy
that begin with very general theoretical principles, such as that the
good consists in aggregate happiness, and then argue back to the
norms and practices constitutive of everyday life, seem basically alien
to the particular and partial perspectives of human agency. The virtues
of Coleman's pragmatic approach, by contrast, are the generosity of its
scope and the modesty of its objectives. Starting from the rich material
of our actual practice, the kind of coherent and holistic explanation
pragmatism insists upon results in a theory of tort liability that shows
its complex relation to human agency, social justice, and moral re
sponsibility. At the same time, because Coleman does not claim that
the corrective justice account is independently morally justified or self
justifying - he acknowledges the obvious point that there are surely
better ways of allocating accident costs than private litigation - his
account avoids the charge of conservatism that dogs intuitionist ac
counts. On the other hand, Coleman's account makes clear how thor
oughgoing a revision the economists propose, not just to our legal
landscape, but to the individualistic perspective on agency to which
the corrective justice account is intimately bound.
Ill. PRAGMATISM AND THE NATURE OF LAW
The second half of the book is chiefly devoted to a distinct prob
lem: how to make sense of law's claim to authority. The authority of
morality's commands lies in their intrinsic goodness or rightness. Law,
by contrast, seems to command us to do or refrain simply because we
are commanded. Its authority is or purports to be independent of the
goodness of its dictates. This claim might be, and has been, denied in
two ways: by anarchists, who deny the authority of law; and by "natu
ral lawyers," who see law's authority as stemming from its capacity to
help us realize the good. But explicating the familiar thought that "be
cause it's the law" seems to provide a prima facie reason for obedience
is the challenge taken on by legal positivists. Modern legal positivism
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descends from H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, the most important
work of legal philosophy of the last century.34 According to Hart, law's
authority depends only on the existence of a social convention among
a group of people, who would agree in their collective practice that
' certain norms - don't steal, written promises are to be kept or dam
ages paid - were to be recognized as obligatory and so obeyed or de
viations therefrom criticized. The law's authority for those people is
simply a matter of their accepting it as authoritative - a bootstrap ar
gument of sorts. (A noteworthy feature of this account is that because
law's authority extends only to those who accept it, legal positivism
takes no position on the political philosophical question whether law
has any authority over subjects who do not accept the convention as
reason-giving but merely abide by it, for example out of fear.) The
convention observed by this group, whose practice is generally obeyed
by others, is called the "Rule of Recognition;" the "rule" is the set of
criteria according to which certain norms are recognized as law, not
just as bits of social morality.35
Many criticisms have been raised against the conventionalist ac
count, chief among them Ronald Dworkin's argument that conven
tionalism fails to capture the disputatiousness of legal practice: the
ubiquity of argument about what the law is on some point despite the
clear absence of any conventional answer.36 A different criticism of
Hart's account, and of its adumbration in Coleman's "Negative and
Positive Positivism,'' has been made by Scott Shapiro.37 According to
the most widely-accepted theory of convention, that of David Lewis,38
to say that a social practice is conventional is to say that the parties to
that practice have preferences with a particular structure: each party
to the practice prefers most to conform to whatever the general prac
tice is, than to engage in any particular form of the practice. To adapt
an example of Lewis', many people adopt a convention that when a
cell phone call is dropped, the caller is the one who calls back.39 This
convention is maintained not because there's any inherent justice in
the caller calling back, but because the most important thing is to have
some settled convention so that each party doesn't meet a busy signal.
Conventions are, in technical language, solutions to coordination
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
35. What characterizes a legal system, or "law" in a general sense, according to Hart, is
the existence, manifest in social practice, of a rule of recognition, as well as primary conduct
guiding norms; secondary power-granting norms, for example governing how to make bind
ing agreements; and other secondary norms governing legal change. Id. at 94-95.
36. DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 135-39.
37. Scott J. Shapiro, Laws, Plans and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming
2002) (manuscript on file with author).
38. DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
39. Id. at 5.
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problems: problems individuals face when they need to act together to
act successfully, but could act together in any number of ways.
As Shapiro points out, the social practice governing what counts in
a community as law seems quite unlike a convention, for the parties to
that practice have strong preferences concerning what criteria to use
in determining the law; they don't prefer conformity of any kind. In
the United States, for example, legal officials share a practice of refer
ring to the Constitution to determine in part what counts as law; this
practice is stable not just because the Constitution was selected as a
coordination point and all prefer to coordinate around something.
Rather, officials coordinate around the Constitution because each be
lieves it sets out the proper criteria for what counts as law. More gen
erally, it certainly doesn't seem to be a necessary feature of a commu
nity's rule of recognition that it be followed as a convention, in Lewis'
sense, for it could be followed for all sorts of reasons. And this poses a
problem for the traditional positivist account.
Coleman's subtle and valuable discussion of the social foundations
of law provides an answer to Dworkin's criticism. Rather than seeing
law's authority as residing in an unreflective convention among offi
cials, Coleman suggests that is a product of their active, reflective and disputatious - cooperation. (Think of how a boxing match is both
cooperative, the fighters accepting a common set of rules and trying to
put on a good show, and competitive, each struggling for his preferred
outcome.) Coleman's use of the term "cooperation" is technical and
draws on recent and influential work by the philosopher Michael
Bratman, as well as work by Shapiro.40 Roughly speaking, persons co
operate when their intentions to engage in some activity manifest a
particular, interlocking structure: each person attempts to be respon
sive to the actions and intentions of the other participants; each is
committed to the success of the activity, and moreover to its successful
realization via cooperative activity; and each is committed to helping
the other participants to achieve the shared goal (p. 96).
Agents who are cooperating are not necessarily in full agreement.
You and I may be cooperating in planting our garden together, each
committed to sharing expenses, digging the beds together, and work
ing out together what to plant in them. But we may be deeply divided
about what to plant, you preferring vegetables and me flowers. Our
cooperative plan to build the garden does not determine this issue, but
it does create a background for, and structure our, bargaining over the
question of what to plant (p. 97). For if we weren't committed to gar
dening together, we would not be constrained at all by considerations
of what the other is willing to accept, or by the budget we have jointly

40. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON
INTENTION AND AGENCY (1999).
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pooled and so forth. Cooperation thus accounts for both agreement
and the nature of our disagreement.
In the case of law, Coleman suggests that judicial practice can be
understood as cooperative in Bratman's sense: judges are mutually re
sponsive, through doctrines of precedent; mutually committed to the
existence of a stable, institutional practice of adjudication; and mutu
ally helpful, through practices of appellate review (pp. 96-97). At the
same time, the kind of disagreement that has captured Dworkin's
imagination, Coleman argues, is well accounted for by the cooperative
model. What is shared by legal officials in a community is not any par
ticular set of legal criteria, as in Hart's account, but a commitment to a
project - to working out, acrimoniously if need be, what the commu
nity's law should be. It is this shared commitment to a project that ex
plains how a community comes to have law; and the particular trajec
tory this shared practice takes explains why it has the law it does. The
invocation of pragmatism here is more implicit than explicit, but no
less real: while positivism's virtue lies in situating the abstract concept
of law in a particular set of social practices, its vice was not looking
closely enough at the actual structure of those practices. The shift
from convention to cooperation reflects a pragmatic commitment to
finding law's structure in actual practice, and so provides an object les
son in the pragmatic approach.41
One question does remain: has Coleman, by eliminating the con
ventionalist basis of positivism, thereby relinquished his claim to a dis
tinctively positivist theory?42 For even a natural law adherent could
41. I should say that while I favor the general approach advanced here by Coleman, I
think the cooperative model still fails to take seriously enough the extent of disagreement at
the foundation of law - principally because many participants in legal practice lack the mo
tivation of mutual helpfulness. I prefer a weaker model of collective action to cooperative
action. See Christopher Kutz, The Judicial Community, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 442 (2001 ) .
42. This argument is pushed very hard by Dworkin in his review of Coleman. Ronald
Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1660-63 (2002) (reviewing The Practice
of Principle). As I understand it, Dworkin's central point seems to be that when positivists
rely on social action defined in such abstract terms as, for example, "cooperatively attempt
ing to determine the community's criteria of legality," they forgo the chief functional advan
tage claimed by traditional positivism: the idea that what defines a community's law is a
strict function of its members' convergent behavior and critical attitudes. Thus, in principle
an observer could determinately read off the law from an account of the commonalities in
participants behavior and attitudes.
True, when the traditional positivist notion of a convention is weakened to Coleman's
point, convergent behavior and attitudes no longer serve to identify the content of a com
munity's law - for the simple reason that Coleman, recognizing the force of Dworkin's ar
gument for pervasive controversy, no longer claims that participants' behavior must con
verge. But Coleman's claim for positivism is metaphysical, not epistemological, as I argued
above: positivism's virtue is that it gives a true account of what makes a given proposition
valid law in a community, namely its logical relation to the cooperative practices of legal of
ficials in that community. Coleman's positivism may therefore be useless in the hands of an
observer trying to divine a community's law from its practices, but it still makes a clear and
controversial claim about law's nature, and thus stands as an alternative to legal theories,
like Dworkin's, that make legal validity turn necessarily on moral merit.
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claim that law's social foundation is cooperative in a relevant sense:
under natural law theory, judges cooperatively seek to determine what
are the morally best standards of law. The cooperation here, however
is only of sociological interest, analogous to the observation that, say,
experimental physics consists of scientists cooperatively trying to de
termine the constituents of the universe. What distinguishes natural
law theories from positivist ones is the normative role played by the
sociological observation. In positivist theories, the cooperative be
havior of the judges makes it the case whether a given proposition
counts as valid law; the judicial behavior fixes the truth of legal propo
sitions.
To return to the physics example, positivism in law is thus equiva
lent to social constructionism in science, according to which scientific
claims count as true just because they are so acknowledged by a com
munity of inquiry; according to scientific realists, by contrast, the truth
of those claims depends only on whether they reflect the way the
world is. Since Coleman insists that the cooperation of social officials
is itself what fixes the truth of legal propositions - or, more precisely,
what fixes the criteria for what counts as law in that community - his
abandonment of conventionalism does not entail abandoning positiv
ism. Though I myself doubt that the cooperative picture of judicial be
havior is fully adequate to the fractious nature of actual legal practice,
Coleman is clearly moving in the right direction in order to save the
positivist project from the meager foundations in unreflective conven
tion that it set for itself.
There is a great deal more of jurisprudential interest in the second
half, including a long discussion of the question whether legal positiv
ism can accommodate the evident role of moral principles in particular
legal systems - for example the principle in U.S. law that the legal
process comport with "fundamental fairness." This question is often
referred to as the question whether "inclusive" or "exclusive" legal
positivism is true, "inclusive positivism" being the view that moral cri
teria can count as part of a community's law whenever social practice
by legal officials makes them relevant to legal decisionmaking. "Ex
clusive positivists" hold that whether or not legal officials sometimes
deliberate using moral criteria, a community's "law" in the strict, defi
nitional sense cannot include those terms. For instance, Raz, the
leading exclusive positivist, has influentially argued that because law's
function in a positivist understanding is basically to resolve conflict
without resort to moral argument, if moral principles play a role in le
gal systems, it is not as "law" but rather as binding extra-legal deci
sional standards.43 Shapiro has argued, relatedly, that if law functions
to guide conduct, then the law must make a "practical difference" to
43. JOSEPH RAZ,
note 9, at 78, 100.

The Identity of Legal Systems, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra
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an agent's deliberations about what to do, either by motivating the
agent or identifying for her what she should do.44 But if the law merely
says, in effect, "do what morality says," then the law is not making a
difference; morality is. For law to make a practical difference, it must
do so by virtue of its mere legality, that is by virtue of its form and in
dependent of its content. Moral norms, by contrast, guide conduct by
virtue of their content, and so moral standards cannot be part of law,
on pain of compromising its guidance function.
Against these arguments, Coleman defends the common sense
view voiced by Hart45 that if law is at root conventional, then some of
those conventions could, in fact, incorporate moral principles as ele
ments of law. I cannot do justice to Coleman's full response to Raz
and Shapiro, particularly to the care with which he explores their
views. But the general nature of his response is to acknowledge the
force of their claims in defining the general character of law as a social
institution, an institution whose function clearly is to provide an
authoritative and decisive guide to conduct. As Shapiro and Raz ar
gue, this function may well be a virtually defining feature of law: a
community whose "law" consisted of the rule "act morally" (or con
sisted of nothing but more specific rules, such as "contracts must be
honored when it would be immoral to break a promise," and "tort
damages must be paid whenever there is a moral duty of compensa
tion,") would not really be a community in which law existed in any
interesting sense. But, as Coleman points out, all this can be true of
"law" in the sense of a "legal system," without holding true of every
particular law. For surely some laws, at the margin, can fail to serve as
uncontroversial or content-independent guides to conduct without un
dermining the general guidance function of law (p. 144). If some laws
can include moral norms, then the rule of recognition for a legal com
munity can include moral criteria, such that at least occasionally legal
validity will turn on moral validity. Hence inclusive legal positivism is
consistent with law's generally guiding conduct without reference to
moral norms.
Coleman's pragmatism seems like an especially healthy interven
tion in this debate for a broader reason, which is the puzzling persis
tence in legal theory of claims about the "conceptual necessity" of le
gal systems having certain features.46 Philosophers generally, in our
post-Wittgensteinian and Quinean age, have tended instead to reject
claims about conceptual necessity, particularly in the case of artifacts
44. Shapiro, supra note 9.
45. In the Postscript to Concept of Law, Hart said that he regards Coleman's position in
Negative and Positive Positivism as a fair statement of his own. HART, supra note 34, at 25051 .
46. See Dworkin, supra note 42, at
rected against Coleman.

1680, for a similar point, although mysteriously di
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and social practices. What, after all, is a conceptually necessary feature
of a chair, or (famously) of a game? For any feature one can name,
there will be some variant of the thing or activity with plausible claim
to the title yet lacking the feature. Legal systems are obviously enor
mously complex, and complexly situated, institutions, which serve or
claim to serve a great range of different functions among communities
whose members take very different stances towards them and their
authority. Compare a piece of showboat legislation, self-evidently
never to be implemented or enforced, with a core element of the
criminal law, such as the prohibition of murder. The way these differ
ent examples of law relate to citizens' self-understanding, institutional
expectations, and broader questions of moral and political theory are
so different that no single, rigid functional characterization of a legal
system's aims can adequately encompass them both.47
Pragmatism's appeal lies in its shrugging off of claims of concep
tual necessity, in favor of a more supple analysis of the way and degree
different features of legal systems satisfy different functional demands.
Here the relevant question is: what degree of content-dependent guid
ance is consistent with the existence of a legal system? The answer to
this question is partly empirical, partly conceptual. We can, and do,
imagine a legal authority functioning as an authoritative system even if
it delegates to agents some responsibility for reasoning morally about
its requirements; yet at a certain point we cease being able to imagine
such a system as law at all. Pragmatism tells us such a conclusion is
what we should expect, for our concepts are children of our practices;
they are made for our world, it is not made for them.
If one side of Coleman's pragmatism is his insistence that concepts
get their content from their social contexts, its obverse is his view that
concepts are not simply reducible to those contexts. This point, that
concepts and conceptual structures can be the legitimate object of
philosophical study, marks Coleman as a kind of moderate among
fellow pragmatists. In the concluding portion of the book, Coleman
defends conceptual jurisprudence against two, more radically prag
matic, alternatives: the "normative jurisprudence" advocated by
Dworkin and the "naturalized jurisprudence" proposed by Brian
Leiter.
According to Dworkin, jurisprudence is not a matter of giving a
neutral description of law's nature, but a morally committed attempt
to justify or criticize how applications of state power flow from a re
gime's particular history and body of principles; legal argument is per
force moral and political argument. Dworkin's insistence that claims
about what law is only make sense as ways of achieving moral and po47. Exclusive positivism's semantic maneuver, counting deviant instances as legally
binding but not law, seems to me a stubborn insistence on maintaining a thesis in the face of
recalcitrant facts.
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litical goals thus significantly extends the basic pragmatic orientation
around practice. In Coleman's view, however, Dworkin mistakenly
moves from the weak but plausible claim that an account of law
should enable us, at the end of the day, to see the value of legal gov
ernance, to the implausibly strong claim that the only way to produce
such an account is by starting from moral premises.
Leiter, by contrast, follows both Quine's repudiation of traditional
epistemology and last century's "Legal Realists" in seeking to explain
adjudication not in terms of law's logic, with its famous indetermina
cies, but rather through the causal explanations offered by psychology
and political science. Against Leiter, Coleman points out that the psy
chologists and political scientists would have no well defined problem
space in which to work - no legal system to study - without the kind
of internal account of law's nature that conceptual jurisprudence aims
to provide.
Coleman's arguments here are probably unlikely to convince his
opponents. Dworkin simply denies what Coleman asserts, namely the
availability of an external, uncommitted perspective on a regime's law
on the grounds that only the committed perspective reveals the non
conventional moral standards he thinks pervasive in actual adjudica
tion. Leiter, meanwhile, could well accept the aprioristic stage-setting
role of jurisprudence and still think it is time for philosophers to close
up shop, leaving the difficult questions about law's operation to social
science. (In a sense Dworkin and Leiter both represent more extreme
versions of pragmatism than Coleman himself.)
IV. CONCLUSION
In his recent (and peculiarly sour) review of Coleman's book,
Dworkin complains about the insularity of contemporary legal phi
losophy, whose practitioners "teach courses limited to 'legal philoso
phy' or analytic jurisprudence in which they distinguish and compare
different contemporary versions of positivism . . . attend conferences
dedicated to those subjects, and . . . comment on each other's ortho
doxies and heresies in the most minute detail in their own dedicated
journals."48 Coming from a member of the academy, Dworkin's bleak
description is bizarre in three ways: first, of course, because that de
scription characterizes all of academic life, not just legal philosophy.
Second because its bleakness seems a product of an alienated outsider,
unable to perceive the excitement and interest of the debates to which
his own writings have contributed so influentially. Indeed Dworkin's
remark seems to reflect precisely the uncharitable interpretive stance

48.

Dworkin, supra note 42, at 1678.
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he deplores as a matter of jurisprudence; it seems committed to seeing
opposing views in their worst, not their best, light.49
Third, and most importantly, this book, in particular, ill deserves
the charge of pedantry. Rather, Practice of Principle is exceptional for
the fresh air it breathes into old debates, blowing aside the dust of
tangential debates and leaving clean a work area in which beautiful
philosophy proceeds.

49. For that matter, the extensive political philosophical debate on equality to which
Dworkin has also notably contributed - whether inequalities are best measured in terms of
Rawlsian "primary goods," economic welfare levels, Sen-ic capacities, or Dworkinian re
sources - could be characterized in precisely the same terms by an outsider insisting on de
ploring it. Yet that debate, for all its occasionally claustrophobic tendencies, has clearly done
a great deal in making clearer what is at stake in questions of justice and equal treatment.

